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WHAT IS MEANT BY FREEDOM?
Paul D. Callister
Introduction – Reflections on “Purpose” and
“Freedom to”
In 1955, in a neglected article in the Harvard Law Review
entitled Freedom—A Suggested Analysis, Lon L. Fuller
provided a framework for the basic definition of freedom.1
More importantly, he tendered a question about the conditions
of a free society: “How can the freedom of human beings be
affected or advanced by social arrangements, that is, by laws,
customs, institutions, or other forms of social order that can be
changed or preserved by purposive human actions?”2 This is
the critical question this article addresses through constructing
a comprehensive definition by first, considering etymology and
then establishing the various modalities in which freedom
operates. These modalities include the space defined by the
 Professor of Law and Director of the Leon E. Bloch Law Library,
University of Missouri – Kansas City School of Law. I wish to thank the
participants of the 2014 Boulder Conference on Legal Information:
Scholarship and Teaching for their numerous suggestions upon reviewing
this article in its initial form. I also wish to thank the Professor’s Group of
the J. Reuben Clark Law Society, who reviewed this paper at their 2016
annual meeting. Karen Hall was particularly helpful. I also wish to thank
Professor Nancy Levit and Chris Blackburn for their excellent editing and
advice. Finally, I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge the excellent
support of my successive administrative assistants, Mary Adams and Laura
Riggs.
1. Lon L. Fuller, Freedom – A Suggested Analysis, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1305
(1955). From one of the only articles to treat Fuller’s article at any length,
“[h]is important contribution has not been considered as part of this debate[,]
[the defense of freedom], partly because Fuller published it prior to the report
of the Wolfenden Committee, and partly because Fuller made his
contribution part of a larger and more complex system of thinking about law.”
Robert C.L. Moffat, “Not the Law’s Business:” The Politics of Tolerance and
the Enforcement of Morality, 57 FLA. L. REV. 1097, 1111 (2005). The
significance of Fuller’s essay on Freedom is suggested by its inclusion in a
very short bibliography by the Encyclopedia of Philosophy. See P.H.
Partridge, Freedom, 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 221, 225 (1967).
2. Fuller, supra note 1, at 1309.
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rule of law and various antithetical non-rule-of-law states, the
role of democracy and representative government in disparate
levels of society, the importance of rights as trumps on power,
and the challenges posed by social justice. Finally, Fuller’s
question raises the issue of “laws, customs, institutions [and]
other forms of social order,”3 all of which luminaries such as
John Stuart Mill saw as unfortunate, but necessary, evils when
considering freedom.4 Rather than necessary evils, this article
will consider the productive role ascribed to law and
institutions by Scott Shapiro, who views law as a form of social
planning that effectuates choices, thus enhancing freedom.5
Prior to constructing a definition of freedom, however, it is
important to understand Lon Fuller’s conceptualization of
freedom because of its value as a framework for any definition.
Fuller draws a sharp distinction between “freedom to,” which
implies choice among a range of alternatives, and “freedom
from,” which Fuller points out can accommodate any ideology
no matter how antithetical to human choice.6 For example,
“freedom from” can be applied to freedom from capitalist
exploitation or colonialism or, in more recent terms, from
Western ideological imperialism (with charges such as Twitter
being an “information weapon” serving U.S. political ends).7
“The objectives of the welfare state and of Buddhism can with
equal facility be stated in terms of ‘freedom from,’ the one
promising freedom from poverty, the other freedom from the
desire for worldly goods.”8 In the extreme, as identified by

3. Id.
4. See infra note 108 and accompanying text. “The second great defect
in Mill’s essay . . . lies in his assumption that all formal social
arrangements—whether legal, customary, institutional, or contractual—are
limitations on freedom, that is, restrictions on choice.” Fuller, supra note 1,
at 1312.
5. See infra notes 106-109 and accompanying text.
6. Fuller, supra note 1, at 1305-07.
7. Tom Gjelten, Seeing the Internet as an ‘Information Weapon,’ NPR
(Sept. 23, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://tinyurl.com/2fj5rsu (“They [undisclosed
countries including Russia] see information as a weapon. An official from one
of those countries told me [James Lewis, adviser to U.N. Institute for
Disarmament Research that] Twitter is an American plot to destabilize
foreign governments. That’s what they think. And so they’re asking, ‘How do
we get laws that control the information weapon?’”).
8. Fuller, supra note 1, at 1306.
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Fuller, it can even mean “freedom from freedom.”9
Fuller’s framework is grounded in the “freedom to,” and in
particular, “the [social] objective of keeping alive the creative,
choosing, and purposive side of man’s nature.”10 Fuller admits
that by exalting the “purposive” side of man’s nature, he is at
odds with the sciences, both physical and social, of his time,
which deny the purposive,11 but he does not care.
Mathematical and mechanical relations are not best described
in terms of purpose, but “[e]xcept on trivial levels, we have not
discovered in human behavior mechanical or mathematical
relationships that will enable us to predict invariant
happenings. In so far as we are able to make sense out of
human behavior in its larger aspects, it is still in terms of
purpose[.]”12 In his construct, purpose and “freedom to” choose
among an array of choices that are closely linked. “[I]t is easy
to see why ‘freedom to’ should have become so unpopular—it
savors too plainly of purpose. On the other hand, ‘freedom
from’ fits unobtrusively into the language of science.”13 While
“freedom to” and purpose may have been less popular in the
science of the 1950s, their status today is even less certain:

9. Id. at 1313.
10. Id. at 1314.
11. Id. at 1308 n.2 (explaining B.F. Skinner’s criticism of purpose).
12. Id. at 1308.
13. Fuller, supra note 1, at 1309.
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FIGURE 1—GOOGLE NGRAM OF “FREEDOM TO” AND “
“FREEDOM FROM”

As the Google Ngram in
Figure 1 suggests,14 today we actually use “freedom to”
more than “freedom from” (at least in print), and we use it
more than at the time Fuller wrote his article when, in 1955,
the use of “freedom from” actually exceeded the use of “freedom
to.” Whether this means that conceptions of freedom comport
more with Fuller’s notions than the concept abandoned as
irrelevant by Skinner and others in the social sciences is
difficult to say.15
Exploring the concept of freedom more completely, Fuller’s
framework has three “significant contexts”:
(1) the absence of nullifying restraints and (2)
the presence of some appropriate form of order
that will carry the effects of individual decision
over into the processes of society. There is a
third requisite for freedom that is both more
difficult to state and more difficult to realize. It

14. For Google Ngram results for “freedom to” and “freedom from,” see
http://tinyurl.com/pyeubrd.
15. See supra note 11.
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may be suggested by saying that, to become
effective,
freedom
requires
a
congenial
environment of rules and decisions.16
Against this framework of contexts, answers to the question
posed in the introductory paragraph above are to be tested,
including the expansive definition of freedom in this article.
Meaning of Freedom—A Working Definition
With Fuller’s framework for freedom as the backdrop, this
article dares to press further and posit a definition that
answers his question about what types of institutions and
social arrangements can facilitate freedom. Consequently, this
article posits that freedom is a certain kind of relationship that
exists between individuals and their kin, tribe, religious
society, city, state, sovereign, or other body politic under
conditions in which (1) such body is subject to the rule of law
with real checks on power such that “legal standards be
general, promulgated, clear, prospective, consistent, satisfiable,
stable, and applied”;17 (2) there exists democratic and
representative government at all pertinent levels of community
in which the individual is engaged and by which arrangements
the individual’s actions may from time to time be legitimately
directed;18 (3) fundamental human rights are not only
expressed in the Constitution and law, but operate as trumps
on the will of the majority or sovereign; and (4) the general
welfare or social justice is sufficiently observed that the
exercise of fundamental rights and privileges is meaningful,
16. Fuller, supra note 1, at 1314.
17. SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 394 (Belknap Press 2011). These
principles are based upon a famous analogy used by Lon Fuller, in which
principles are taken from the deconstruction of the failure of a fictional King
Rex to rule his kingdom. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33-39
(rev. ed. 1969).
18. Fuller, supra note 1, at 1314-15 (discussing the relationship between
decisions made by an individual and made for the individual, including the
need for “consultation” of the individual in decisions made for him or her). “If
individual freedom is to be meaningful, the decisions that are made for the
individual must be congruent with, and form a suitable framework for, his
own decisions.” Id. at 1314.
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but such rights and privileges are not suppressed by attempts
to serve general welfare or social justice. Each of the four parts
of the definition is referred to as a modality or mode, meaning,
from the Oxford English Dictionary, “a particular form,
manner, or variety in which some quality, phenomenon, or
condition occurs or is manifested.”19 In the sense used in this
article, freedom is not absence from restraint, which is often
the counterfeit of freedom. In its truest sense, freedom is
similar to citizenship, with both attendant rights and
obligations. Laws and institutions can play a critical role in
defining and economizing choices to heighten, rather than
subvert, freedom. This article shall consider fundamental
human rights to include not only such fundamental rights as
expressed in the American federal and state constitutions and
the decisions of courts interpreting the same, but such
additional rights as may exist in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights,20 or by other recognized sources of law. Just
how such a conceptual definition is arrived at is the subject of
this article, and what follows offers the building blocks for a
construct of freedom as proffered above.
Freedom –– An Etymological Journey from Negating
Restraint to Citizenship
The moment in my life that I felt the most free was
perhaps when I was seventeen. It was spring break, and two
friends and I were in a van pulling a waterski boat toward
Lake Mohave on the California-Arizona border. The music of
the rock bands Asia and Journey were blaring as we raced
down the highway through the desert. We were going to have
four days without any parental supervision—my friend’s
parents were coming out later in the week to join us. In the
meantime, we were on our own to waterski, cliff-jump, swim,
sun bathe, read Louis Lamour novels, or do whatever we felt
like doing.
This kind of freedom is what is often referred to as

19. Mode, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 5a (3d ed., 2002).
20. G.A.
Res.
217A
(III),
art.
19
(Dec.
http://tinyurl.com/cgnkmq (last visited Nov. 16, 2015).
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“negative freedom.”21 The restrictions that typically governed
lives of myself and my friends—mandatory attendance at
school, the duty to show up for dinner, do nightly homework,
and keep mom and dad informed of my whereabouts, and of
course curfews—had been removed. “We are negatively free to
the extent to which no one stops us from acting on our
desires. . . . But there is another, more positive aspect of
freedom, which is the ability to do certain actions. . . . Someone
can enjoy negative freedom, but have very little positive
freedom.”22 In this case, we also had the positive freedom of
having the keys to the van and the boat, a credit card for gas,
and some spending money.
However, freedom is more complex than simply the feeling
we get on spring break: it entails complex relationships.
Etymologically, the English word for free has “the same IndoEuropean base as Sanskrit priya beloved, dear. . . .”23
Furthermore, it compares to “the same Indo-European base
Sanskrit priyā wife, Old English frīg love, (plural) affections,
Old English Frīg the name of the goddess Frig (see FRIDAY n.),
and (in a different declension) Old English frēo woman (rare:
see note), Old Saxon frī woman, wife.”24 Note that in German
and Dutch, the word for woman is indistinguishable from
wife.25 So why does the word free have any etymological
relationship with dear, love, and wife?
This sense perhaps arose from the application of
the word as the distinctive epithet of those
members of the household who were ‘one’s own
blood’, i.e. who were connected by ties of kinship
with the head, as opposed to the unfree slaves. In
the context of wider society only the former
would have full legal rights, and hence, taken
21. SHAPIRO, supra note 17, at 61.
22. Id.
23. Free, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d. ed., 2008).
24. Id.
25. For Dutch, compare the entry for wife with the entry for woman.
F.J.J. VAN BAARS & J.G.J.A. VAN DER SCHOOT, ENGLES NEDERLANDS 350, 353
(Het Spectrum 1982) (both are translated as vrouw). For German, compare
the entry for wife with the entry for woman. WÖRTERBUCH: ENGLISH –
DEUTSCH DEUTSCH-ENGLISH 312, 314 (Orbis 1987) (both are translated Frau).
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together, they would comprise the class of the
free, as opposed to those in servitude. Compare
the Old English compounds frēobearn free-born
child, child or descendant of one’s own blood,
frēobrōðor one’s own brother, frēodohtor free-born
daughter, daughter of one’s own blood, frēom g
one’s own kinsman . . . .26
To be freeborn in the old Teutonic and Anglo-Saxon worlds
was to be “wife born,” and hence not born of a slave, but to be a
full member of the household and be free. To be free was not to
be without family (as in the freedom I felt from my six siblings
and parents when I was on my spring break vacation at Lake
Mohave), but to be in relationships of kinship rather than
servitude.
This is the same sense in which the Apostle Paul and the
chief captain of the guard at Jerusalem declared their
respective statuses (and thus Paul escaped a whipping): “Then
the chief captain came, and said unto him, Tell me, art though
a Roman? He [Paul] said, Yea. And the chief captain
answered, With great sum obtained I this freedom. And Paul
said, But I was free born.”27 Here, the Greek word, used by the
captain, for “freedom” is πολιτείαν (pol-ee-ti’-an) “from (‘polity’):
citizenship: concerning a community . . . .”28 Paul indicates
that he is “free born” (γεγ ννημαι from γενος—kindred, nation
or stock),29 in contrast to the captain who has paid for his
citizenship. Historically, freedom has been about relationships,
not the absence of them. For the old Anglos-Saxons, freedom
was about kinship; in the more sophisticated world of RomanJudea, the issue was about being part of the polity or
citizenship of Rome, the city state that ruled what Romans
perceived was the known world. The point is that freedom, at
least etymologically, has required the establishment of strong
26. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 23.
27. Acts 22:27-28 (emphasis added).
28. Compare ALFRED MARSHALL, THE INTERLINEAR KJV-NIV: PARALLEL
NEW TESTAMENT IN GREEK AND ENGLISH, Acts 22:28 (1975), with JAMES
STRONG, THE EXHAUSTIVE CONCORDANCE OF THE BIBLE, Greek root no. 4174
(1890, 1980).
29. Compare MARSHALL, supra note 28, Acts 22:28, with STRONG, supra
note 28, Greek root nos. 1080 and 1085.
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relationships to institutions and other individuals, and not the
absence of them.
Indeed, circumstances which promote
freedom as the absence of responsibilities and duties to others
are the counterfeit of the ideal.

FIGURE 2–MAYFLOWER COMPACT
The Mayflower compact speaks to this nexus between liberty
and relationships. Because the Mayflower landed off course in
Cape Cod, rather than Virginia territory, colonists argued that
they would have to enter into an initial compact:30 “That when
they came a shore they would use their owne libertie; for none
had power to command them, the patente they had being for
Virginia, and not for New-england, which belonged to an other
Government, with which ye Virginia Company had nothing to
doe.”31 This is a remarkable instance of John Locke’s social
contract coming into being by virtue of the colonists missing
their landing zone. It also illustrates that the nature of liberty
or freedom is to enter into relationships (in this case, a
covenant), rather than to avoid them entirely. Indeed, the
pledge is “doe by these presents solemnly & mutually in ye
presence of God, and one of another, covenant & combine our
selves togeather into a civill body politick. . . .”32 The colonists
were binding themselves to each other into a political body.
30. BRADFORD’S HISTORY “OF PLIMOTH PLANTATION”: FROM THE ORIGINAL
MANUSCRIPT 180-81 (Boston Wright & Potter Printing Co., 1898) (1856) (the
compact, however, dates to 1620). For source of Figure 2 and an online
version, see http://tinyurl.com/jm5w234 (electronic version prepared by Ted
Hildebrandt, 2002).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 182.
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Like Paul’s Roman Captain, the essence of freedom was to be
exercised into creating binding forms of political citizenship,
rather than escape from obligations (as the first part of the
compact makes clear by the colonists referencing themselves as
“loyall subjects” of King James). The compact is recognition
that the colonists are not bound by the same conditions they
would have been had they landed in the territory of Virginia;
they are, in effect, “free agents” to enter into a new agreement,
although with some relationship back to the British crown.
Returning to etymology, in freedom, the suffix – dom adds
a legal connotation and is “in Old English dóm, statute,
judgement, jurisdiction,” and
in Old English as a suffix to n[ouns] and
adj[ective]s, as biscopdóm the dignity of a bishop,
cyningdóm, cynedóm, royal or kingly dominion,
kingdom, ealdordóm the position or jurisdiction
of an elder or lord; þeowdóm, the condition of a
þeow or slave; fréodóm, háligdóm, wisdóm the
condition or fact of being free, holy, or wise.33
Thus, the – dom in freedom means the condition of being free,
but it also reflects the jurisdictional aspect of being found to be
free.
Being free, then, is not about being released from
relationships, but about the kind of relationships we bear
toward one another and the various institutions in our
societies. It reflects a particular kind of jurisdiction quite
different from servitude or that of a sovereign lord.
Similar to freedom, liberty has an interesting etymology:
“Anglo-Norman libertee, Anglo-Norman and Middle French
liberté freedom from constraint or necessity, free will (late 12th
cent. as livreteit , after livrer liver v.) (in plural) freedoms or
immunities (accorded to a town, etc.) (1266) . . . .”34 While
liberty has meant lack of restraint, it has also been used to
describe the “freedoms and immunities” of the polis or town (or
the jurisdiction of that town). Relationships to the community
33. Dom, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1897).
34. Liberty, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d. ed. 2010).
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are central to the concept of liberty. Indeed, this article argues
that this does not mean the absence of all restraint, and it is
not in this sense that we should use the term or the word
freedom when thinking about and discussing the question of
freedom presented in this article—i.e., does it vary with
information environment? Rather, it shall be argued that
freedom and liberty carry with them relationships to
individuals and institutions that do in fact vary with the times
according to the information environment of that time and
season.
As we think in more abstract terms, on a larger societal
scale, freedom manifests itself in different modalities.
Modalities of Freedom – –Considering Definition
Elements (1) – –(4)
Freedom is a state of affairs that can be considered in four
modalities based on this article’s working definition: rule of
law, participatory and representative government, individual
rights, and social justice.35 These modalities act as different
lenses through which to view freedom. Restrict or deny any of
the elements of freedom described in these modalities as
follows, and the state of affairs becomes less free.

35. See supra text accompanying notes 17-18.
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Modality (1) – The Rule of Law and Antithetical
States
In considering what institutions can do to advance the
cause of freedom, the presence of the rule of law is a key
consideration to any analysis. Societies exist in differing states
with relation to the rule of law. Consider the chart in Figure 3
below:

FIGURE 3 – RULE OF LAW AND ANTITHETICAL STATES
Essentially, any given society’s relationship to the rule of law
can be described with reference to a plane defined by two axes.
See Figure 3 above. Suppose the horizontal axis is rule of will
(in its most singular form, it is expressed as that of a tyrant,
whose every whim and fancy, unchecked by law, must be met)
lies opposite the rule of the mob (for example, a lynch mob, who
likewise ignores rule of law—the niceties of legal procedures
and individual rights to expedite its sense of justice or
entitlement). The opposite of rule of the will is the rule of the
many or the mob, and the collapse of order. I will not call this
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anarchy because there are philosophical forms of anarchy that
accept order if free from threat of violence or coercion,36 a
concept to be elaborated upon later.
The vertical axis is represented by rule of law (to be
explained later in what immediately follows) versus the rule of
power (for example, the rule of money, such as prevails in
Afghanistan following the U.S. intervention).37
It is
particularly significant that rule of law lies opposite the rule of
power. As shall be discussed later, in its most basic form, rule
of law represents a check on power,38 and as a corollary
unlimited power would not be subject to any checks.
Consequently, the sliding scale is from rule of law to rule of
power (or the absence of meaningful checks on power).
Interestingly, in a recent article, Nick Cheesman pointed
out his dissatisfaction with the problem that rule by law and a
36. See SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, THE ANARCHIST IN THE LIBRARY: HOW THE
CLASH BETWEEN FREEDOM AND CONTROL IS HACKING THE REAL WORLD AND
CRASHING THE SYSTEM 4 (2004) (“Anarchists do not oppose or deny governance
as long as it exists without coercion and the threat of violence.”).
37. Based on conversation with researcher, Andrea V. Jackson, then
from the Institute for Rule of Law, Identity, Stability, and Culture, whose
viewpoint (after considerable time in Afghanistan) is that the country has
become subject to the “Rule of Money” with the United States being the
supplier that is distorting government and social structures.
38. RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD THE RULE OF
LAW 65 (2002) (“[T]here is general agreement in China and elsewhere that
rule of law requires at minimum that the law impose meaningful limits on
state actors, as reflected in the notions of a government of laws, the
supremacy of the law, and the equality of all before the law.”). Rachel
Kleinfeld also gives significant weight to “checks” on power:
At its heart, the rule of law is about the structure by which
the government and governed determine the rules of society
and hold each other accountable to those rules. Therefore,
work to reform the power structure within other countries
focuses on building the checks and balances on power that
form the bedrock of a rule-of-law state. Some of these power
centers are “vertical”—they check government from below,
such as through organized groups of concerned citizens,
religious institutions, and other areas of legitimacy within
society. Other power centers are “horizontal”—they might
provide checks and balances between and within
government agencies, such as internal investigative units
among police, or the division of powers between an
independent judiciary and other parts of government.
RACHEL KLEINFELD, ADVANCING THE RULE OF LAW: NEXT GENERATION OF
REFORM 20 (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2012).
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related concept, law and order, do not seem to be symmetrical
or on the same sliding scale that descends from rule of law.39
“The opposite of law and order is, well, the absence of order.”40
In Figure 2, the absence of order might be initiated by the rule
of the mob, but the absence of order is not necessarily the
opposite of the rule of law. There might be a rule of someone or
some will, but without the checks on power of the rule of law.
Consequently, rule of law and law and order are, in
Cheesman’s
terminology,
“asymmetrical
opposites.”41
Furthermore, the fact that rule by law occupies a space
between the two axes of Figure 2 above, rather than lying
directly on the rule of law axis, is in harmony with Cheesman’s
general thesis.
In the figure, no society finds itself on any of the cardinal
points. Rather, they are described in relation to the four
points. For example, in the United States, we have rule of law
(law operates as a check on many abuses of power), but one
might argue that it is heavily peppered with the rule of money
(or power), given the cost of running for office. This is but one
dimension in the figure. The United States must also be
described in terms of the rule of will (whether of one or
oligarchy) and the rule of themob (or the many). Although the
United States can take pride in its democratic tradition, its
history is littered with examples of the lynch mob. In contrast,
in modern day Russia, rule of law may curb some of the worst
abuses of power, but fear of the FSB (the successor to the KGB)
and a culture of intelligence gathering operate to concentrate

39. See Nick Cheesman, Law and Order as Asymmetrical Opposite to the
Rule of Law, 6 HAGUE J. RULE OF L. 96, 107 (2014) (“And so dissatisfied with
the analytic limitations of the rule-by-law concept, I turn to the last part of
my argument that law and order is a concept asymmetrically opposed to the
rule of law . . . .”). To Cheesman’s question, “What is zero rule of law?” I have
answered with the “Rule of Power” or the absence of any checks on power. Id.
at 106. Cheesman does not come out and say that rule by law is
asymmetrical to rule of law, rather he expresses dissatisfaction that this is
so, and then presents his analysis that law and order are asymmetrical to the
rule of law, leaving the reader to question whether rule by law and law and
order are the same or even related concepts.
40. Id. at 108.
41. See Cheesman, supra note 39, for reference to “asymmetrical
opposites.”

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/3

14

2017

WHAT IS MEANT BY FREEDOM?

521

power in the hands of a few.42 Thus states are described with
reference to two dimensions, or scales, rather than one.
Cheesman’s asymmetrical opposites function to provide
dimension to describe the state of any given society. A twodimensional chart, which separates rule of law and rule of will,
thus adds significantly to understanding the rule of law and
related concepts such as rule by law and law-and-order.
Referring back to the horizontal axis in Figure 2, the rule
of will is best exemplified by Mao Zedong. Mao so dismantled
the legal apparatus of China that there was not even
appearance of rule by law, let alone rule of law.43 Rule by law
is the counterfeit of rule of law. In such instances, law
operates not as a check on power, but as an instrument to
impose the will of the sovereign of the day. In Figure 2, rule by
law is a function of two scales or axes—rule of law and rule by
will. There will be more on rule of law as a cardinal element
later.
Finally, there is rule of the mob – –the lynch mobs of the
nineteenth and twentieth century. The problem for the mob
was always the same – –if we, the mob, pause for legal
procedure and allow the accused his or her modicum of human
rights, there is a good chance he or she might just go free.
Another example is the democratic assembly of 500 Athenian
“jurors” who elected to put Socrates to death for corrupting the
minds of the youth in Athens.44

42. See, e.g., Lawyers, Legal Scholars Warn of Erosion of Rule of Law in
Russia (British Broadcasting Service, Lexis Advance July 28, 2013) (“The
law-enforcement agencies and security services – the Investigations
Committee, internal affairs bodies FSB [Federal Security Service], the
prosecutor’s office – blatantly and sometimes even demonstratively, cynically
violate the constitutional and other legal norms, including by fabricating
criminal and administrative cases against those who criticize the
authorities.”).
43. PEERENBOOM, supra note 38, at 74 (“The legal system during the Mao
era, particularly during the Cultural Revolution, was a good example of an
extreme version, to the point where at times it could hardly be described as
even a rule-by-law-legal system, which, after all, implies some form of lawbased order.”).
44. See generally Douglas Linder, The Trial of Socrates (2002),
http://www.famous-trials.com/socrates.
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Returning now to the rule of law. Essentially, the rule of
law operates to check the most egregious abuses of power. A
number of years ago, a “thin theory” of rule of law was
developed by scholars to try and separate out rule of law from
democratic practices and western notions of human rights –
not that these latter practices are inessential to freedom. The
point of this theory is that democratic elections and human
rights are not the only factors contributing to freedom. There
is something that law, in particular the rule of law, provides
that is important and distinctive from democracy and human
rights. The thin theory of rule of law consists of a number of
certain practices:45
45. PEERENBOOM, supra note 38, at 65 (Autumn 2002) (citing FULLER,
supra note 17, at 39). Other conceptualizations or lists of the requirements of
what is known as the “formal version” of the rule of law have been
formulated. Lon Fuller’s theory, called “legality” has been summarized as
“generality, clarity, public promulgation, stability over time, consistency
between the rules and the actual conduct of legal actors, and prohibitions
against retroactivity, against contradictions, and against requiring the
impossible.” BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS,
THEORY 93 (2004) (citing FULLER, supra note 1, at ch. 2). Joseph Raz listed
the elements to:
include that the law must be prospective, general, clear,
public, and relatively stable. To this list Raz added several
mechanisms he considered necessary to effectuate rules of
this kind: an independent judiciary, open and fair hearings
without bias, and . . . discretion of police to insure
conformity to the requirements of the rule of law. The first
set of requirements also found in [Friedrich] Hayek and
[Roberto] Unger, is a standard statement of the dominant
formal version of the rule of law.
TAMANAHA, supra note 45, at 93. See also Paul P. Craig, Formal and
Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical Framework, PUB.
L. 467, 469 (Autumn 1997) (adding a requirement of “access to the courts”
and clarifies that “the discretion which law enforcement agencies possess
should not be allowed to undermine the purposes of the relevant legal rules”).
Another prominent author, Judith Shklar, summarizes Fuller’s “inner
morality” or formal theory of rule of law: “Law must be general, promulgated,
not retroactive, clear, consistent, not impossible to perform, enduring, and
officials must abide by its rule.” JUDITH N. SHKLAR, POLITICAL THOUGHT AND
POLITICAL THINKERS 33 (Stanley Hoffmann ed., 1998). A relatively recent
reformulation by Rachel Kleinfeld, extending beyond “thin theory,” but
incorporating some of its elements, is:
Governments are subject to laws and must follow preestablished and legally accepted procedures to create new
laws.
Citizens are equal before the law.
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Law is based upon procedural rules for enactment and
made by an institution with authority (to this I would
add that the thin theory presupposes a shared cognitive
authority46 – that there are certain touchstones in a
society, that its members recognize as authority).



Under the theory, the law must also be transparent,
public, and accessible (this is where factors such as
literacy, libraries, and affordable access to legal
services and published law comes into play). Law that
is intermediated by a professional class of lawyers,
clerics, or priests can operate to either clarify or
obfuscate the law.



The law must be general – it must not be targeted to
the advantage or disadvantage of similarly-situated
groups – it must generally apply in equal measure to
similarly-situated groups.

Judicial and governmental decisions are regularized: They
are not subject to the whims of individuals, or the influence
of corruption.
All citizens have access to effective and efficient disputesolving mechanisms, regardless of financial means.
Human rights are protected by law and its implementation.
Law and order are prevalent.
KLEINFELD, supra note 38, at 14-15. Kleinfield’s theory incorporates human
rights, but I have chosen to treat them separately in this article’s section,
Modality (3)—Individual Rights. Kleinfield’s treatment of the subject of Rule
of Law is an essential read. However, given the varying formulations of rule
of law and finding that Peerenboom’s statement of the thin theory of the rule
of law is the most elaborate, I have used Peerenboom’s elements and
embellished them for my own formulation of rule of law.
46. See generally Paul Douglas Callister, The Book as Authoritative Sign
in Seventeenth-Century England: A Review through the Lens of Holistic
Media Theory, in LAW, CULTURE AND VISUAL STUDIES 49, 51-54 (Anne Wagner
& Richard K. Sherwin eds., 2014); Robert C. Berring, Legal Information and
the Search for Cognitive Authority, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1673 (2000).

17

524

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 37:2



The law must be clear and be capable of being
understood; ironically and hyper-technical areas of the
law like tax and intellectual property might actually
serve to undermine rule of law, although providing
careers for attorneys, law professors, and the
compliance industries that grow around these technical
areas.



The law must be prospective – no ex post facto laws (i.e.
laws passed to outlaw deeds or omissions that have
already transpired).



Laws must be consistent – that is, they must be
rational. The great example of a rational field of
knowledge has always been geometry because of the
consistent outcomes for innumerable scenarios that
geometry could produce from five basic axioms or
postulates. Of course, rational systems, like geometry,
have a great weakness, as illustrated by the
development of non-Euclidean geometries, whereby it
was possible to produce equally rational (or consistent
system) by denying some of the postulates or axioms
(e.g., the shortest distance between two points is not a
straight line, but a curve or the sum of the angles of a
triangle is greater than 180 degrees). Furthermore,
non-Euclidean geometries proved useful in advanced
sciences and navigation. What this suggests for rule of
law is that just because its basic tenants produce
consistent results does not ensure that the whole
system is not arbitrary and that some other rational
system of law might produce a better, more equitable,
state of affairs.



The law must be stable. Similar to rationalism,
consistency is part of this element, but beyond that
question is one for positive law about how frequently
legislative bodies and courts should change the law.
Generally, predictability is thought to be the hallmark
of a good legal system. Lack of consistency undermines
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this and discourages investment, contracting,
formation of capital, employment, and the general
stability of a society. At the same time, the law must
be flexible: “[The] [l]aw must be stable and yet it cannot
stand still.”47


The law is fairly applied. Law that is not fairly
applied, particularly along economic, ethnic, and racial
lines, produces a distrust of the law among those not
favored by it. The support of all classes of society for
rule of law is essential to its existence.



The law must be applied as it has been promulgated,
often in writing. Interpretation of the law to favor one
party or another, in the end, undermines law as a
credible institution.



The law must be uniform. We have already discussed
uniformity in terms of fairness and consistency, but
there is another aspect in which the law must be
uniform – coverage. The great city of Athens should
not be said to be subject to the rule of law if all that its
law governed was parking – where and when to park.
Theoretically, a society could be lacking in rule of law –
crucial codes to punish theft and murder, tort laws to
cover injury and negligence, etc. – and still have a
carefully-administered set of traffic and parking laws.
There needs to be uniformity of coverage.



The law must be enforced (meaning, the gap between
law on the books and practice must be narrow). It is
fairly obvious that the failure to prosecute murder or
theft on a regular basis by the state would undermine
the rule of law. What does it mean for a state or city if
no one adheres to traffic laws? Is there rule of law?
Thorny subjects include wholesale refusal to enforce
immigration laws, laws against recreational drug use,
prostitution, copyright, and intellectual property. If

47. ROSCOE POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 1 (1923).
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breaking such laws becomes the norm, then the rule of
law is threatened.


Finally, the law must be accepted by a majority of those
affected. I remember watching with a mixture of
horror and bemusement as drivers in New York in
oncoming lanes refused to stop for red lights that would
have otherwise permitted cars in my lane from lawfully
turning left to cross or carry traffic safely. How could
there be such whole-scale willful violation of law?
Assuming this attitude were to multiply to an extent
that the law, in general, became something to be
ignored, disrespected, or treated as irrelevant, a serious
breakdown of rule of law would occur.

The above outline of thin theory, embellished by me but
present in legal literature since the 1960s, can serve as a useful
canary in the coal mine for assessing rule of law in a society.
The theory’s elements collectively operate as a major
component of freedom because, as a whole, rule of law operates
as a check on power and the curse of oppression. Lon Fuller,
who first outlined this theory, referred to the elements as law’s
“internal morality,”48 and this served as his rationale for
rejecting the philosophy of legal positivism,49 a debate about
which we need not concern ourselves here. However, these
elements serve as touchstones of freedom.
Even when
democratic elections and human rights are absent, the
elements of thin theory can reveal whether there are checks on
power—a minimum standard that might serve as one former
U.S. Army major unofficially put to me: “of a country we can do
business with.”
Thin theory is also consistent with Fuller’s article on
freedom.50 Thin theory’s check on power provides a protective
barrier for “nullifying restraints”—an element of the requisite

38).

48. SHAPIRO, supra note 17, at 394 (citing FULLER, supra note 17, at 33-

49. SHAPIRO, supra note 17, at 394 (“Contrary to legal positivism,
therefore, the existence of the law does depend on moral facts.”).
50. See Fuller, supra note 1.
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contexts for freedom.51 Acceptance of laws by the majority, the
law’s consistency, stability, fairness, and uniformity, and the
recognition of procedural rules for the adoption of laws, all
support Fuller’s requirement for a congenial environment for
rules and decisions.52 We should hardly be surprised, however,
that Fuller is consistent with himself.
Returning to the two axes and law coordinates in Figure
2—rule of will, rule of mob, rule of law, rule of power— every
society finds itself somewhere on this plane, but none are
represented by a single coordinate.
Some interesting combinations arise in relation to the
different axis points. Tribal societies often have rigid codes of
honor, but may function more by rule of the mob – in the sense
that obligation of kinship or groups supersede allegiance to
laws of the state, even when enacted through duly-elected
representatives. The tribes envisioned by the chart are not
those held together as personality cults behind strong central
leaders, but rather by tradition and law in a decentralized
environment with competing and coexisting tribes operating
under similar principles of law and custom. On the opposite
side of the chart, tyranny and oligarchy operate with apparatus
of the state in a centralized environment.
Extreme manifestations of the welfare state, where votes
are bought in exchange for the promise of social benefits, may
be represented in a quadrant dominated by demagoguery,
mobocracy, and power. The essence of demagoguery is when
powerful individuals or groups use the money, media, and
other forms of power to win support of the masses to effect rule.
The problem is that rule by the masses or the mob can be
inherently unstable and unpredictable. Mobs are, by their
nature, unruly, demanding and fickle. Kitty-corner on the
diagram, rule of law becomes rule by law when it ceases to
operate so much as a check on power and becomes an
instrumentality to execute the will of a supreme sovereign or
clan of oligarchs. Rule by law is a counterfeit of rule of law – it
has rules, but no real checks on power.

51. Id. at 1314; see also supra text accompanying note 16.
52. See generally Fuller, supra note 1; see also supra text accompanying
note 16.
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There are a number of exchanges that operate in this plane
as well. Those who rule by will may exchange some form of
identity (the hopes, dreams, sense of belonging, historical
territorial claims, and aspirations of people) for loyalty of the
masses. This exchange has been discussed at length in my
earlier articles on the Market for Loyalties.53 Power holders
(the wealthy, military, and those in charge of domestic
intelligence agencies) are willing to exchange rule of law in the
forms of some checks on this power in exchange for
legitimacy.54 Indeed, it is often in the interest of all states to
pursue rule of law as a pathway to legitimacy, and thus a way
to consolidate their rule.
Modality (2)—Democracy and Representative
Government
Most of us remember our high school civics lessons on the
virtues of democracy and republican forms of government. But
the subject is far from stale or static. Like changes in
information environments in the past, the Internet is
challenging how we think about and implement democratic and
representative forms of government in new communal contexts.
An important work in this area is The Anarchist in the Library:
How the Clash Between Freedom and Control is Hacking the
Real World and Crashing the System by Siva Vaidhyanathan.55
Vaidhyanathan describes the Net in terms of community – a
community that is governed not by hierarchically proscribed
laws, but by communal protocols.56 Indeed, such an approach
allows Vaidhyanathan to take anarchy seriously—not anarchy

53. See generally Paul D. Callister & Kimberlee Everson, Analysis of
Freedom of Information for its Effect on Society by Considering 2011, the Year
of the Arab Spring, 6 INFO. L.J. 36 (2015); Paul D. Callister, Identity and
Market for Loyalties Theories: The Case for Free Information Flow in
Insurgent Iraq, 25 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 123 (2006); Paul D. Callister, The
Internet, Regulation and the Market for Loyalties: An Economic Analysis of
Transborder Information Flow, 2002 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. POL’Y 59 (2002). See
also Market for Loyalties Theory, WIKIPEDIA, http://tinyurl.com/hso245v (last
visited Feb. 14, 2017) (explaining market for loyalties theory).
54. See PEERENBOOM, supra note 38, at 126.
55. See generally VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 36.
56. See id. at 33-38.
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in the sense of violent overthrow of the government, but an
approach that rejects the need for centralized authority. It
instead recognizes the role of Web protocols, mavens, and peerto-peer networks in not just building the Web,57 but in
facilitating new organizational structures for society. This is
an anarchy reminiscent of the “social anarchism” described in a
well-known article by Peter Coy—violence against the state is
not its defining feature.58 Rather, in an essay by Herbert Read,
“the main consideration in any political philosophy should
therefore be the preservation of individual freedom. . . . Such
freedom, I argue, can only be preserved in small communities,
free from a central and impersonal exercise of power . . .”59 It
is, rather, a rejection of government, particularly a centralized
government that is the common theme. “Peace is anarchy.
Government is force, force is repression, and repression leads
to reaction, or to the psychosis of power which in turn involves
the individual in destruction and the nations in war.”60 It is
this kind of anarchy to which Vaidhyanathan refers as he
describes the Net.

57. See id. at xvi-xvii and 12-21.
58. See Peter E. Coy, Social Anarchism: An Atavistic Ideology of the
Peasant, 14 J. INTERAMERICAN STUDIES & WORLD AFFAIRS 133 (1972).
“[T]errorism is a form of government and the abolition of government is what
Anarchism is all about. Moreover, even Lenin recognized that pamphlets
were more effective agents of social change than firearms.” Id. at 136. Coy
does not appear to totally eschew violence, at least in his idealized
description of a Mexican highland village, where there are limits on the
practice of religion, or lack thereof, enforced by incarceration:
Villagers are permitted by their fellows to vary in quantity
and quality of their piety according to their needs and
means. There is only one minimal standard: that no one
within the community public demonstrate his disbelief; he
who dos so, whatever his power and position is likely to find
himself thrown into village lockup . . . .
Id. at 146. Apparently, religion is coopted by anarchist philosophy, and so
the complete denial of it is not tolerated. See id. at 145-46.
59. HERBERT READ, ANARCHY AND ORDER: ESSAYS IN POLITICS 25 (1971).
60. Id. at 121.
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In some of Vaidhyanathan’s new structures, scholars
Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink have identified, on an
international scale, as transnational advocacy networks.61 “By
building new links among actors in civil societies, states, and
international organizations, they [advocacy groups] multiply
the channels of access to the international system . . . By thus
blurring the boundaries between a state’s relations with its
own nationals and the recourse both citizens and states have to
the international system, advocacy networks are helping to
transform the practice of national sovereignty.”62 This is a
fairly important change to the international order of things,
which has traditionally been viewed as billiard balls that may
hit and knock each other about on their surfaces, but which do
not have relations internally.63 Notably, the United States
currently favors the role of nongovernmental “stakeholders” in
governing the Net, rather than the dominance of governments
favored by Russia and China.64 The change means that many
more of us have a voice in the international system; the places
to vote are increasing. From the prospective of freedom, the
change challenges us—having a voice in each of the
communities to which we belong may mean democracy has
become more complex, multilayered, and dependent on status
in the respective communities.
Returning to networks, many of these transnational
advocacy networks have special expertise and, in the words of
John Gerald Ruggie (who borrows from Michael Foucault), are

61. See MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND
BORDERS ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 2-4 (1998). See
also Eric Dannenmaier, Lawmaking on the Road to International Summits,
59 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 3 (2009).
62. KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 61, at 1-2.
63. Alex Prichard, Anarchy, Anarchism and International Relations, in
CONTINUUM COMPANION TO ANARCHISM 96, 101 (Ruth Kinna ed., 2012) “This
‘billiard ball model’ of international relations presents world politics as
consisting of hermetically sealed states with no linkages between them,
ricocheting off one another, with the largest bouncing the hardest and
invariably swallowing up smaller ones like in some epic interplanetary
collision.” Id.
64. See Unified Internet at Stake in UN Negotiations, ELECTRONIC COM.
L. REP. (Bloomberg BNA), Aug. 26, 2015.
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“epistemic communities”65 because they are built around
“bureaucratic position, technocratic training, similarities in
scientific outlook and shared disciplinary paradigms.”66 The
global nation-state system has moved from communicating
exclusively through diplomats to communication through
members of epistemic communities, and the Net has been at
the heart of this change. In some instances, the field of
democracy may be expanding, and the Net is primed to
facilitate such changes. Freedom requires that the right be
heard, and that each of the stakeholders have access to a
forum.
In the end of Anarchist in the Library, after reviewing the
power of the Net to both enhance swarming mobs and
oligarchical structure, Vaidhyanathan calls for civic
republicanism—in his case, meaning a Net whose most
egregious abuses of property rights (copyright and trademark)
are curbed, but at the same time governed by institutions run
by people who hopefully are accountable to the netizens who
find community and freedom in the domain we call the Web.67
Recall that citizenship is fundamental to freedom in our prior
discussions of the etymology of freedom.
What is so fundamentally different about the Web is the
use of private ordering,68 including protocols and individual
contracts (much like the ideals of John Locke), to create
communities that transcend national borders and traditional
legal jurisdictions. Protocols are distinguished from codes by
Vaidhyanathan because they are not imposed by hierarchical
authorities but are reached by consensus.69 For example, the
standards for HTTP, HTML and CSS, the open access protocols
for browsers as of the time of this writing, were reached by
consensus through an organization (really a community of
experts, an “epistemic community”), known as W3C.70 If a Web
65. John Gerard Ruggie, International Responses to Technology:
Concepts and Trends, 29 INT’L ORG. 557, 569 (1975).
66. Id. at 570.
67. VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 36, at 188-92.
68. For use of term “private ordering,” see Margaret Jane Radin,
Regulation by Contract, Regulation by Machine, 160 J. INST. & THEORETICAL
ECON. 142 (2004).
69. VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 36, at 16-21.
70. See W3C STANDARDS, http://www.w3.org/standards/ (last visited Feb.
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surfer uses these protocols correctly, Internet browsers will be
able to interact with his or her Web documents—otherwise, he
or she is excluded from participating on the Net, or rather of
being part of the technical conversation that is part of the Net.
The same is true in international law. If ambassadors fail to
present certain credentials and follow protocols, no dialogue
between nations can occur. One nation state does not have
sovereignty over another simply because its ambassadors
follow international protocols, nor has it exercised or
threatened force to compel action of the other state; rather, by
using protocols, states can participate in the international
order. In the digital environment, protocols are distinguished
from controls in that they, like law, dictate compliance.
Harvard law professor Lawrence Lessig has authored at least
two books pointing out the vulnerabilities of code to constrain
behavior on the Net.71 Net Delusions author Evgeny Morozov
makes similar claims.72 As Vaidhyanathan puts it, “if a
protocol is a handshake, a control is a full nelson.”73 The point
is this: protocols provide an alternative to subjugation of
controls whether embedded in computer code or in diplomatic
communications of the sovereign.
What Vaidhyanathan has also observed, by taking
anarchical communities seriously, is that creative and cultural
efforts prosper in such environments as proffered by the Web;
however, he also finds that the Web enables the negative
aspects of anarchy, such as swarming to commit acts of violent
protest at international events such as the 1999 WTO summit
in Seattle—”‘smart mobs’ are still mobs.”74 Instead, what
Vaidhyanathan calls for is discussion within a framework of
Cultural Democracy and Civic Republicanism, the former being
14, 2017).
71. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE
COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD (2001); LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER
LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999).
72. See EVGENY MOROZOV, THE NET DELUSION: THE DARK SIDE OF
INTERNET FREEDOM (Public Affairs 2011).
73. VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 36, at 33.
74. See id. at 188. Like the WTO protests in 2011, originators of the
Occupy Wall Street Movement planned to use “swarming” techniques,
particularly after the Zuccotti Park was cleared. See Mattathias Schwartz,
Pre-Occupied: The Origins and Future of Occupy Wall Street, THE NEW
YORKER (Nov. 28, 2011), http://tinyurl.com/j7lpbme.
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a liberal environment permitting creative use and reuse of
materials on the Internet, and the latter being a recognition of
the responsibilities that go with citizenship and membership of
any community.75 For Vaidhyanathan, it is about culture, and
a fundamental belief that cultural development thrives in
environments with liberal borrowing or imitation of what has
become ensconced in intellectual property.
Another maven of cyberspace, Harvard Law Professor
Lawrence Lessig, likewise makes the case for providing a
liberal cultural environment on the Internet; Lessig argues for
“remix culture.”76 In carefully choreographed multimedia
speeches broadcast over the Internet, Lessig argues that prior
to radio, society enjoyed a “read-write” culture with respect to
music. New tunes were passed from performer to audience,
who, in turn, performed, modified, and passed along the work
to others. Lessig quotes John Philips Souza for support that
the “talking machines” had a negative effect on the
development of culture, in particular music.77 These “infernal
machines” facilitated the movement toward a write-only
culture, where the producers of music and programing were
narrowly proscribed and centralized. Now, after the age of
radio, phonograph records, and the eight-track tape recorder,
an age when the public could only read (or listen) to what was
given to it, the Internet has brought society back to the age of
read-write culture. But, warns Lessig, this state of affairs is
only the case because the code underlying the Net
(Vaidhyanathan would have used the word “protocol”) permits
this to be so.78
The question of the modern era is whether the extremes—
rule of the mob and oligarchy, or even autocracy—are
75. See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 36, at 188-92.
76. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN
THE HYBRID ECONOMY (2008); LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG
MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL
CREATIVITY (2004).
77. Lawrence Lessig, Laws that Choke Creativity, TED TALKS: IDEAS
WORTH SPREADING (Mar. 2007), http://tinyurl.com/as32o9.
78. Tarleton Gillespie, WIRED SHUT: COPYRIGHT AND THE SHAPE OF
DIGITAL CULTURE 189 (2007) (quoting LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF
CYBERSPACE, supra note 71, at 43-44) (“[I]t is not hard for the government to
take steps to alter, or supplement, the architecture of the Net. And it is those
steps in turn that could make behavior of the net more regulable.”).
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facilitated at the expense of democratic and republican forms of
government. This article will review this issue, but at the
same time, the question of Democracy and Republicanism is
not the only mode for consideration of freedom—as already
mentioned, the rule of law, and as yet to be mentioned human
rights and social justice, need to be considered in the analysis.
In so far as autocracy goes, this is philosopher Martin
Heidegger’s nightmare. Heidegger had been a Nazi prior to
World War II, but his philosophy in later years came to be
informed by his experience; he expressed a deep distrust of the
drive of all things, particularly technologies, toward a single
will.79 In a state of a single will, law may still exist, but it is
reduced to that of other goods and commodities. It is simply
“instrumental” to the single will. Such a state is known as
autocratic “rule by law.” In such a state, even people are
reduced to be commodities and instrumentalities of the single
will—this was Heidegger’s nightmare.
In short, democratic institutions will be challenged by the
Web. At the same time, the possibility for exerting one’s voice
in a broader range of institutions has increased. This is exactly
the result Fuller sought in his context number 2—”the
presence of some appropriate form of order that will carry the
effects of individual decision over into the processes of
society.”80 We will need to work hard to keep the democratic
propensity alive and in line with Fuller’s objectives for a free
society.81 Fuller even criticizes Mill’s essay on freedom for not
recognizing the need for “arrangements” to facilitate choice:
“Mill seemed strangely blind to the fact that in all significant
areas of human action formal arrangements are required to
make choice effective.”82 We might see those “arrangements”
as the “protocols” of the Web, the stateless institutions that dot
79. Paul D. Callister, Law and Heidegger’s Question Concerning
Technology: Prolegomenon to Future Law Librarianship, 99 LAW LIBR. J. 285,
286-90 (2007).
80. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
81. See Gjelten, supra note 7 (arguing that the threat of a free and open
society on the net to totalitarian regimes and their efforts to make the net
less open).
82. Fuller, supra note 1, at 1312. “[Mill] generally retains . . . the notion
that the forms of social order are a kind of unfortunate necessity and that
freedom consists in their absence.” Id. at 1312 n.3.
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the landscape of the new international order, or institutions as
old as the ballot box.
There is one other aspect of modality (2) that must be
treated in this section: “by which [democratic and
representative] arrangements the individual’s actions may
from time to time be legitimately directed.”83 The direction of
the individual was important to Fuller. He justified it because,
assuming democratic institutions, “we must draw the man
whose freedom is in question into consultation; we must afford
him some participation in the decisions that affect the practical
significance of his freedom.”84 It is natural to think of such
participation in legislative function, but Fuller significantly
includes judicial functions because litigants are included
through their attorneys.85 The role of law and institutions in
effectuating individual choice is further addressed in the final
section of this paper below.86
Modality (3)—Individual Rights
We live in an age when a single philosophy has challenged,
and in large measure rejected, the notion that rights can exist
apart from commands or legislative political action (which
includes constitutional ratification and amendment) in the
form of some higher law or moral principle. This philosophy is
called legal positivism, and it has been embraced by much
liberal thinking. Certain luminaries like John Austin, Jeremy
Bentham,87 and H.L.A. Hart propounded a theory that
explained all rights, including those articulated by courts, as
“convention,” “command,”88 or “enacted by existing political
authority.”89 “It would never be sufficient to point out that soand-so is the morally legitimate authority, that people have

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

See supra text accompanying notes 17-18.
Fuller, supra note 1, at 1315.
Id.
See infra text accompanying note 105.
See John Finnis, Natural Law: The Classical Tradition, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 9 (Jules
Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds. 2002).
88. Id.
89. Legal positivism, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999).
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inalienable rights, that certain texts are sacred, or that a given
interpretive methodology produces the best results from the
perspective of public policy.”90 Essentially, there was no higher
moral authority or natural law to which one could appeal as a
source of freedom. Regardless of such thinking, a wellregarded legal philosopher and critic of legal positivism, Ronald
Dworkin, maintained the primacy of individual rights, in
among other works, of Taking Rights Seriously. For Dworkin,
certain political rights trump the power of other legislated acts:
So a claim of political right is a claim to a trump
over the general welfare for the account of a
particular individual . . . We emphasize the
special injustice of torture, for example, when we
speak of a right against torture, because we
claim that torture would be wrong even if it were
in the general interest. But it is appropriate to
speak of a right not to be tortured even when
torture would serve only private or illegitimate
interests. Torture in this latter case is wrong a
fortiori.91
Assuming a perfectly democratic society, a legal right
should exist against torture without having to legislate it—at
least the argument is so strong that it is the burden of anyone
(Jack Bauer from the hit show 24 included) to demonstrate
that this is not the case.
It is policy that has given us “enhanced interrogation
techniques,” but Dworkin’s trumps are rooted in principle
rather than policy:
I call a ‘principle’ a standard that is to be
observed, not because it will advance or secure
an economic, political, or social situation deemed
desirable, but because it is a requirement of
justice or fairness or some other dimension of
90. SHAPIRO, supra note 17, at 102.
91. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 431 (Bloomsbury
Publishing, 2013).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/3

30

2017

WHAT IS MEANT BY FREEDOM?

537

morality. Thus the standard that automobile
accidents are to be decreased is a policy, and the
standard that no man may profit by his own
wrong a principle.92
Policies express the will of the majority and are utilitarian
in nature, smacking of the “general welfare.” They are the
backbone of positivism. The dilemma for rooting individual
rights in principle (meaning something other than the
expressed policies of the majority) is that it directly challenges
democratic fiat and raises many questions about how such
principles are to be discerned and who is qualified to do so? It
gives rise to the issue of judges “making law.” What is to limit
the will of the majority being overturned? Grounding rights in
principles and natural law is exactly what Jeremy Bentham
referred to as “nonsense upon stilts,”93 but that is precisely
what Dworkin does in his attack on positivism. The success of
Dworkin’s attack rests on a fortiori cases such as the rule
against torture—ironically, a not unheard-of dilemma in
modern times with the American government’s use of
waterboarding against terrorists.
For positivists, a
government’s actions speak louder than moral principles.
For us, the question is more subtle: are we any less free if
our society rejects the idea of rights based upon moral
principles rather than legislative, judicial, or executive fiat?
Perhaps it is the case that checks on power, the essential
element of rule of law, is more potent when grounded in
principle because they are less likely to be changed by the
operation of legislative, judicial, and executive processes;
however, such principles must be interpreted by such
processes, and these interpretations may change over time. In
any case, for Fuller’s concept of freedom, the absence of
“nullifying restraints” is imperative.94 Whether based upon
principle or legislative, judicial, or executive fiat, the important
thing is that rights operate as trumps on unmitigated power.

92. Id. at 39.
93. Ross Harrison, Jeremy Bentham, in THE OXFORD COMPANION
PHILOSOPHY 87 (Ted Honderich ed., 1995).
94. See supra text accompanying note 16.
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Modality (4)—Social Justice
The modalities of freedom would not be complete without
contemplating John Rawls’ work on social justice. Nor is there
a better guarantee of the last part of our definition—”that the
general welfare or social justice is sufficiently observed that the
exercise of fundamental rights and privileges is meaningful,
but not suppressed by attempts to serve the general welfare or
social justice”—than the lexical ordering of rights introduced by
Rawls.95
The modern liberal framework for discussing
individual rights has been through the lens of social justice as
described by John Rawls and a host of legal scholars who have
engaged his theories.96
Rawls is most noted for his consideration of justice as
fairness and his separate treatment of basic liberties (freedoms
to vote, hold office, of conscience, etc.) and social values
(income, opportunity, and wealth). In his original formulation
of the principle of basic liberties, “each person is to have an
equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic
liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.”97
Before social values or “goods” could be considered, basic
liberties had to be equal. Under his theory, it would not be just
to restrict basic liberties even if it meant that a more equitable
distribution of social values could be achieved. He referred to
this as a “lexical ordering,” meaning that individual access to
equal liberties had to be satisfied prior to any consideration of
social welfare.98
95. See supra text accompanying note 18 (specifically, definitional
element (4)).
96. The significance of Rawls’ work is hard to overstate:
John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice is a modern classic and its
impact on contemporary legal thinking has been profound.
One indicator of the work’s influence is the staggering
number of law review articles citing A Theory of Justice.
Another measure is its frequent citation in opinions of
American courts—a phenomenon that is unduplicated by
any other twentieth-century work of political philosophy.
Lawrence B. Solum, Situating Political Liberalism, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 549,
550-51 (1994) (citing JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971)).
97. RAWLS, supra note 96, at 302.
98. Id.
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For instance, suppose there were two groups of people, A
and B, and that it were possible to quantify their basic liberties
and their material benefits in society. Possible scenarios for
the division of liberties and benefits might look like the
following:99
TABLE 1
Alternative Structures of Liberties/Social Goods
Citizen Group

I (Group A/B)

II (Group A/B)

III (Group A/B)

Group A

10/10

9/25

10/15

Group B

10/10

11/50

10/20

Even though structure II maximizes social goods for both
groups (25 for A and 50 for B), it is unacceptable because basic
liberties are unequal (group A only gets 9 while group B gets
11). Equality among basic liberties (as represented by the first
value, before the slash) has to be achieved first before
maximization of social goods can be considered. In this
instance, structure III is the superior and morally just
arrangement. To illustrate further, suppose there were a class
at an elementary school for which some of the parents paid
tuition and some, due to indigent circumstances, did not.
Suppose further that all of the children were allowed to run for
and vote for various class offices—class president, hall monitor,
newspaper editor, etc., but that due to budget limitations,
packages of Crayola had to be divided up differently. Students
from families who did not pay tuition got a pack of ten Crayolas
for the year, but students from families who paid full tuition
would get the box with thirty Crayolas. For Rawls, this is a
just arrangement. It preserves incentives to pay tuition—your
child gets a bigger box of Crayolas—but still preserves
99. See FRANK LOVETT, RAWLS’S ‘A THEORY OF JUSTICE’ 46, fig. 3.1 (2011).
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fundamental liberties—running and voting for class office—as
equal. If, on the other hand, the school had decided to hand out
equal boxes of Crayola (say, boxes of twenty Crayolas each) to
every child, regardless of whether his or her parent paid
tuition, but incentivize the payment of tuition by restricting
running for office to children of tuition-paying parents, the
arrangement would fail Rawls’ basic test because running for
office is a political right (assuming that value is to be
inculcated in grade school) is lexically prior to the division of
Crayolas as resources.
Now for purposes of this article, what is interesting is
whether we are talking about the division, not of Crayolas, but
of the allocation of library books or time on the Internet (e.g.,
non-tuition paying students can check out one book per week
and have no Internet access, but full tuition students can check
out as many books as they want and are entitled to one hour
per day on the Internet). Where books and the Internet fall in
Rawls’ formulation—as fundamental liberties or social goods—
is important because the former is lexically prior, meaning it
must be satisfied first with equal distributions, and the latter
permits differences in allocations. Consequently, how we think
about books and information media (whether they should be
treated as lexically prior or as secondary) is critical in
determining whether access and availability of such media in
society is just and fair—i.e., a prerequisite for freedom.100
Rawls’ theory can turn freedom (particularly “freedom to”)
on its head by exalting as the first lexical imperative “freedom
from” values. If the first lexical imperative is freedom from
hunger or freedom from fear, and other freedoms, like freedom
to speak, play a secondary role in the lexicon, Rawls’ system
creates a society that may not satisfy the other elements of this
article’s definition or Fuller’s framework. Certain rights, like
freedom of assembly and worship and freedom of speech, may
100. While the right to information is not expressed in the United States
Constitution, it is more than the aspiration of librarians and is expressed
under Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which
provides “[e]veryone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this
right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek,
receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless
of frontiers” G.A. Res. 217A (III), supra note 20, at art. 19 (emphasis added),
http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/.
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no longer serve as effective trumps under the third modality for
freedom if lexical prioritization is not arranged with them as
the highest priority.101 Nor, under the first modality, will there
be the “thin theory” protection of like-people generally treated
alike under the law—one can imagine a situation of equality of
“freedom from” hunger, but not “freedom to” speak.102 The role
of hunger in relation to fundamental rights is not to be lightly
cast aside. The International Declaration of Human Rights
provides in Article 3 for the “right to life.”103 Argument can be
made that “freedom from” starvation flows from it. The point is
Rawls’ lexical prioritization has to have resolved the hierarchy
of rights and values and that resolution must comport with the
overall definition of freedom, particularly modality (3) on rights
as trumps. In other words, there has to be congruity between
the modalities. Nonetheless, there is room for considerations of
social justice—of opportunity and oppression—but with Rawls’
lexical prioritization demanding a hierarchy of rights, Fuller
advocating the ascendancy of “freedom to” values, and Dworkin
requiring rights to operate as trumps on government action,
even at the expense of social welfare. Hence the formulation of
modality (4) of the definition, “the general welfare or social
justice is sufficiently observed that the exercise of fundamental
rights and privileges is meaningful, but such rights and
privileges are not suppressed by attempts to serve general
welfare or social justice.”104

101. See supra notes 82-86.
102. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
103. See supra note 20. Article 1 also bears upon the question providing
that humans are “equal in dignity,” something that poverty denies.
104. See text accompanying supra note 18.
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Law as Social Planning—The Institutional
Imperative for Freedom
My cousin returned from two years as a missionary in the
Dominican Republic. He described the rules of the road as “you
don’t want to hit me, and I don’t want to hit you, so let’s make
a deal.”105 More correctly, my cousin was describing the
absence of rules of the road, and the phenomenon that occurs
in this absence is constant negotiation. The problem is that a
state of constant negotiations is inefficient. Per a recent book,
Legality, by Scott Shapiro,106 what should result is a kind of
social planning that produces laws or rules of the road, and
which reduces the inefficiencies of constantly negotiating what
side of the road to drive on, who has to yield to whom, what to
do at a crossing, how fast to drive, etc. Now, in all likelihood
these rules do exist in the Dominican Republic, but they are
ignored in favor of private negotiation. Further shedding light
on the sad condition, my cousin reports instead of stopping at
stop signs that cars honk twice while proceeding directly
through the intersection, that police frequently try to flag down
motorists to solicit bribes, and that motorists routinely ignore
such commands. A preference to avoiding corrupt police can be
easily understood, but the question remains why Dominicans
seem to prefer private negotiations to traffic rules established
by the state—rules which should be favored under Shapiro’s
thesis.
Before exploring plausible answers to that question, we
need to understand a great deal more about Scott Shapiro’s
contributions in Legality. His theory represents a form of
positivism that might be called “Plan Positivism,” which he
combines with planning theory—really a theory that legal
activity is an activity of social planning.107 Shapiro develops a
narrative of a wonderful community springing out of a cooking
club, evolving into a business, going public on the stock market,
selling out their interests, buying an island, and rapidly
105. Conversation with James Barton Callister after return from
mission to the Dominican Republic in the 1990s.
106. SHAPIRO, supra note 17.
107. Id. at 178, 195.
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evolving a sophisticated government through “nested planning”
on what becomes known as “Cook’s Island.” In Shapiro’s
narrative, government is not an evil necessity resulting from
bad men—the contention made by the likes of James Madison,
Thomas Hobbes, and David Hume,108 but rather Shapiro’s
island develops in a happier atmosphere with planning powers
being delegated, because it is simply more efficient to delegate
planning authority than to have an environment of constant
bargaining and consensus forming activity:
[I]t is extremely costly and risky for people to
solve their social problems by themselves, via
improvisation, spontaneous ordering, or private
agreements, or communally, via consensus or
personalized forms of hierarchy. Legal systems,
by contrast, are able to respond to this great
demand for norms at a reasonable price.
Because hierarchical, impersonal and shared
nature of legal planning, legal systems are agile,
durable, and capable of reducing planning costs
to such a degree that social problems can be
solved in an efficient manner.109
In other words, even in a society of all good actors, legal
systems (and presumably the rule of law) would arise because
it is just not efficient to keep negotiating how order is to be
maintained.
Shapiro’s narrative and theory run on the
necessity of efficiency. This is what Fuller calls for when he
identifies in his framework of freedom the need for the
“presence of some appropriate form of order that will carry the
effects of individual decision over into the process of society.”110
Law and social planning also legitimize the second half of
modality (2), concerning “by which arrangements the
individual’s actions may from time to time be legitimately
directed.”111

108.
109.
110.
111.

See id.at 173-74.
Id. at 172.
Fuller, supra note 1, at 1314.
See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
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Returning to the Dominican Republic and the constant
negotiation while performing the task of driving—the “you
don’t want to hit me, and I don’t want to hit you, so let’s make
a deal— the question arises: why do individuals who have such
chaotic traffic reject any scheme of rules of the road and prefer
a situation of constant negotiation? The answer may be
cultural or as simple as frustration with a lack of resources.
The Dominican Republic has about 519 people per kilometer of
road, compared to forty-nine people in the United States. It
also has four times the number of traffic deaths per 100,000
people. The following table is illustrative:112
TABLE 2

Country

Populatio
n per KM
of Road

Population
per KM of
Paved
Road

Population
per Square
KM of
Land

Traffic
Deaths per
100,000
inhabitants

Bahamas

117.42

204.51

31.87

13.7

Cuba

181.77

370.96

100.73

7.8

Dominican
Republic

518.63

1,035.21

211.50

41.7

Netherlands

120.64

Unavailable

495.83

3.9

United
States

48.67

72.38

34.56

10.4

Something is wrong with the Dominican Republic. While
it is true that it is a very densely populated country, this alone
does not account for the fact that Dominicans prefer bargaining
while driving instead of conforming to established laws

112. See THE WORLD FACTBOOK, http://tinyurl.com/h9xdl2h (last updated
Nov. 4, 2013); see also Wikipedia, List of countries by traffic-related death
rate, http://tinyurl.com/h2surkj (last visited Nov. 25, 2013) (based upon WHO,
GLOBAL STATUS REPORT ON SAFETY 2013, at http://tinyurl.com/cza7qbj).
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dictating rules of passage and yielding while driving on
Dominican roads. The Netherlands have more than twice the
population density, and, having lived there for a year, I can
attest that they have a very good traffic system, one governed
by law and order. The fact that really stands out is that
Dominican Republic simply does not have enough roads,
particularly paved roads, to support its large populations. This
may result from poor planning, lack of resources to build the
roads, or most likely a combination of the two factors.
Astonishingly, the effect is not only measured in traffic
congestion and deaths, but in a whole scale abandonment of
following the basic rules of the road. Indeed, we might even
conjecture that based upon Shapiro’s theory, the Dominican
Republic suffers from a lack of the rule of law. Interestingly, a
World Bank Report, amalgamating various indices and
measures of the rule of law, places the Dominican republic in
the range of 30% (see Figure 3), whereas The Bahamas have
declined from the high 80s to the 70% range in the last decade
(see Figure 4 below).113

FIGURE 3—WORLD BANK RULE OF LAW AGGREGATE
INDICATOR: DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

113. The rule of law statistics were generated from the World Wide
Governance Indicators, Interactive Data Access, at http://tinyurl.com/ox6pocp
(select “Country Data View,” “Rule of Law,” “All Years” and compare
“Dominican Republic” and “Bahamas, The”). Copies of the download report
are on file with the author.
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FIGURE 4—WORLD BANK RULE OF LAW AGGREGATE
INDICATOR: THE BAHAMAS
The United States has maintained a score in the low
90s.114 Shapiro’s thesis that law is a planning activity designed
to more efficiently transact what individuals do on a day-to-day
is consistent for the Dominican Republic (where adherence to
such planning appears to be non-extant or severely limited)
and other aggregate measures of the rule of law showing a
breakdown of rule of law in the Dominican Republic by no less
a prestigious institution than the World Bank.
Returning to Shapiro’s planning thesis—that law can be
described as a kind of planning activity—one has to wonder
about the stark contrast of idealistic, non-Hobbesian
community in Shapiro’s narrative (perhaps best represented on
the chart of the Bahamas) and whatever is going on in the
Dominican Republic that makes it such a dangerous place to
drive. Can it all be explained by the reputed preference of
Dominican’s to “make a deal” while driving, rather than
adhering to any system of formal traffic laws? Perhaps the
Dominican’s state of affairs can be reduced to some sort of
failure in planning, as evidenced by the sheer congestion of the
roadways (e.g., five times as many people per mile of paved
roads as the Bahamas). Also important is the failure to adhere
to such planning as evidenced by the Dominicans driving
114. The rule of law statistics were generated from the World Wide
Governance Indicators, Interactive Data Access, at http://tinyurl.com/ox6pocp
(select “Country Data View,” “Rule of Law,” “All Years” and select “United
States”). Copies of the download report are on file with the author.
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behaviors (constant negotiations, honking, instead of stopping,
at stop signs, and waiving off police commands).
Not all planning or even social planning, according to
Shapiro’s thesis, is legal activity, nor is all activity that
produces norms legal activity. Simply planning roadways is
not legal activity. However, activity is legal activity if it “(1)
produces norms that are supposed to settle, and purport to
settle, questions about how to act; (2) dispose addressees to
obey; and (3) is purposive, that is, has the function of producing
norms.”115 In the Dominican Republic, assuming there had
been efforts to plan traffic laws, what is missing is element (2),
the dispositive element: “All legal philosophers agree that legal
systems exist only if they are generally efficacious, that is, they
are normally obeyed.”116 In the Dominican Republic, the
fundamental element of efficacy of traffic law is missing. This
translates not simply into a suggestion of failed legal activity
following Shapiro’s theory, but based upon our earlier
discussion of the elements of thin theory, the final element is
missing—the law must be accepted by a majority of those
affected.117 It is not, in the words of Fuller, a “congenial
environment of rules and decisions.”118
Furthermore,
legal
planning
imposes
certain
characteristics, such that, as quoted above, “[b]ecause
hierarchical, impersonal and shared nature of social planning,
legal systems are agile, durable, and capable of reducing
planning costs to such a degree that social problems can be
solved in an efficient manner.”119 This is relevant to this
article’s concept of freedom. As discussed above, it is only
through relationships that freedom is actualized.
Those
relationships include the citizenship, community, and the
establishment of officials and institutions that can effectively
regulate the affairs we so often take for granted and which
occur so regularly in common life. Otherwise, life would be full
of constant negotiation and transacting business for the most
115.
116.
117.
point).
118.
119.

SHAPIRO, supra note 17, at 201.
Id. at 202.
See supra note 45 (with reference to the final, enumerated bullet
See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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common of events, driving, disposing of trash, establishing
what rights go with property, etc. In a sense, we are freer in a
complex world because legal activity has interposed itself to
take over the mundane.
Summary
Freedom does not mean the absence of restrictions. It is
not summed up in the Constitution or its Bill of Rights. It is a
complex concept best viewed in different modalities: Rule of
Law, Democracy and Representative Government, Individual
Rights and Social Welfare. In considering these modalities,
this article has also considered the framework for freedom
tendered by Lon Fuller and attempted to answer his question:
“How can the freedom of human beings be affected or advanced
by social arrangement, that is, by laws, customs, institutions,
or other forms of social order that can be changed or preserved
by purposive human actions?”120 Consequently, this article has
not contented itself with discussion of restraints and their
absence but has always kept institutions, including law as an
institution, in mind.
Returning to the definition of freedom, rule of law is
perhaps foremost in its modalities because it considers the
checks on power as creating the space necessary for free choice.
Even before the Bill of Rights was enacted, the Constitution
contained checks and balances to limit power. Long before the
American Constitution, the Magna Carta limited the power of
the English monarch in relation to the noble classes and “free
men.”121 Per the “thin theory” rule of law, a list of basic
elements, such as procedures for making rules, access to law,
and no ex post facto laws, are used as evidence of rule of law.122
Also with respect to rule of law, states may be represented

120. Fuller, supra note 1, at 1309.
121. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN, RENÉE LETTOW LERNER, & BRUCE P. SMITH,
HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL
INSTITUTIONS 123-24 (2009). “No free man shall be arrested or imprisoned or
disseised or outlawed or exiled or in any way victimized, neither will we
attack him or send anyone to attack him, except by the lawful judgment of
his peers or by the law of the land.” Id. at 125.
122. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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as existing on a plane, with Rule of Law being one of the
cardinal points, and Rule of Mob, Rule of Power, and Rule of
Will. Rule by Law is a counterfeit of Rule of Law. Certain
exchanges occur where by states give into certain checks on
power in exchange for legitimacy. Furthermore, power holders
trade identity in exchange for loyalty. It is within this plane
formed by the cardinal points that freedoms are permitted and
restricted by the realities of power or the absence thereof.
Democracy and representative government will be
important considerations in many of the information milieu,
but our current digital age has created particular challenges in
that the Net enhances the power of both oligarchs and
anarchists. The trick is how to balance the powers of the Net—
on the one hand to continue the creativity that has been
unleashed by allowing users to remix and publish their own
content, and on the other to restrict the abuses of copyright law
and “swarming”—the phenomenon whereby mob activity is
coordinated by the Web. The challenge is how to preserve a
liberal democratic scheme that will promote creativity and
instill a sense of civic republicanism that will promote a kind of
citizenship or netizenship (the essence of freedom) on the Net.
As the last modality, law and social justice has been
considered. There are so called positive freedoms—freedoms
that can occur only because there are sufficient resources and
opportunity. The leading theorist in the field for the last fifty
years has been John Rawls. Rawls argues for a Pareto
optimization; however, before social values or “goods” could be
considered, basic liberties had to be equal.123 The fundamental
question remains as to what those basic liberties should be and
how information environments affect outcomes under the
theory.
For instance, how would a potential right to
information (such as under article 19 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights)124 be treated under Rawls’
theory?
This article has also given consideration to a new theory
from Scott Shapiro arguing that law is a type of social planning
involving officials that purports to settle questions about how
123. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
124. G.A. Res. 217A (III), supra note 20, at art. 19.
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to act, that disposes obedience from citizens and subjects, and
that is purposive in producing norms.125 This new theory most
closely aligns to the rule of law modality, and in particular thin
theory, as discussed above. What is important is that the most
recent jurisprudential theorist has described a theory that
aligns with the rule of law modality, regardless of whether we
accept or reject positivism. The point being that rule of law
may be foremost among the considerations when contemplating
freedom in relation to jurisprudence and law.
In the end, what does freedom mean?
It means
citizenship. It posits relationships rather than restraints, and
it orders them in ways harmonious to both society and the
individual. May humanity’s aspirations for freedom burn long
and bright, regardless of milieu, as defined by information
technologies and other challenges.

125. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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